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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
Nos. 12-2122 & 12-2726 
________________ 
 
J. MICHAEL LIGHTNER, 
Regional Director of Region 22 of the 
 National Labor Relations Board 
for and on behalf of the National Labor Relations Board 
 
Appellant in No. 12-2726 
 
v. 
 
1621 ROUTE 22 WEST OPERATING COMPANY, LLC 
D/B/A/ Somerset Valley Rehabilitation and Nursing Center 
 
Appellant in No. 12-2122 
 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action Nos. 3-11-cv-02007, 3-11-cv-03960 &  
3-11-cv-04072) 
District Judge: Honorable Mary L. Cooper 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
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Before:  AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 4, 2013) 
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Laura T. Vazquez, Esquire 
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1099 14th Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20570 
 
Saulo Santiago, Esquire 
Michael P. Silverstein, Esquire 
National Labor Relations Board 
Region 22 
20 Washington Place 
Newark, NJ 07102 
 
 Counsel for Appellant /Cross-Appellee 
 
Rosemary Alito, Esquire 
George P. Barbatsuly, Esquire 
K&L Gates 
One Newark Center, 10th Floor 
Newark, NJ 07102 
 
 Counsel for Appellee/Cross-Appellant 
 
Ellen Dichner, Esquire 
William S. Massey, Esquire 
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Gladstein, Reif & Meginniss 
817 Broadway, 6th Floor 
New York, NY 10003 
 
 Amicus Counsel for Appellee 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
I. 
 In 2010 Appellee/Cross-Appellant J. Michael Lightner, 
the Regional Director of Region 22 of the National Labor 
Relations Board (the “NLRB” or “Board”), brought charges 
of unfair labor practices before the NLRB against 
Appellant/Cross-Appellee 1621 Route 22 West Operating 
Co., LLC, d/b/a Somerset Valley Rehabilitation and Nursing 
Center (“Somerset Valley”).  While administrative 
proceedings were pending on that complaint, the Board 
brought a petition in federal court under § 10(j) of the 
National Labor Relations Act (“the Act” or “NLRA”), 29 
U.S.C. § 160(j), seeking temporary injunctive relief to 
prevent Somerset Valley from engaging in behavior that 
violates the Act and to reinstate certain employees.   
 After discovery and eight days of hearings, the District 
Court filed a 129-page opinion coupled with an order granting 
in part and denying in part the Board’s petition.  In that 
comprehensive and well-crafted opinion, the Court enjoined 
Somerset Valley from interfering with its employees 
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associating with the labor union, and required the 
reinstatement of two discharged employees.  The Court 
refused to order Somerset Valley to reinstate two other 
employees or to order the rescission of notices of discipline 
filed against certain employees.  
 Somerset Valley appealed the parts of the order 
enjoining it and requiring it to reinstate the employees, and 
the Board filed a cross-appeal challenging the Court’s refusal 
to order reinstatement of the discharged employees not 
reinstated.  Those appeals were consolidated before us.  
Before the merits of the cross-appeals were fully briefed, the 
Board issued a decision and order in the administrative action 
that rendered moot the temporary injunctive relief order by 
the District Court.  The Board then filed this motion to 
dismiss the cross-appeals and to instruct the District Court to 
vacate its opinion and order.  Somerset Valley agrees that the 
appeals are moot and should be dismissed, but opposes 
vacatur.  
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. 
§ 160(j).  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.   
 The purpose of NLRA § 10(j) is to preserve the 
Board’s powers to decide violations of the Act “by giving the 
NLRB an opportunity to seek an injunction of alleged 
violations before an injury becomes permanent or the Board’s 
remedial purpose becomes meaningless.”  Chester ex rel. 
NLRB v. Grane Healthcare Co., 666 F.3d 87, 96 (3d Cir. 
2011).  It gives a district court authority to enter temporary 
interim relief while retaining “the Board’s exclusive authority 
to decide the merits of the case[].”  Id.  Because the Board has 
decided the merits of the complaint against Somerset Valley, 
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we agree with the parties that the Board’s pursuit of 
temporary relief is moot.  Yet there remains the dispute 
whether the District Court’s opinion should be vacated.  
Although the judgment has become moot, we retain the 
authority “to enter orders necessary and appropriate to the 
final disposition of a suit that is before us.”  U.S. Bancorp 
Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 22 (1994). 
III. 
 When a civil case becomes moot while an appeal is 
pending, the normal practice is to vacate the district court 
judgment “because doing so ‘clears the path for future 
relitigation of the issues between the parties.’”  Alvarez v. 
Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 94 (2009) (quoting United States v. 
Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 40 (1950)).  This equitable rule 
prevents “‘a judgment, unreviewable because of mootness, 
from spawning any legal consequences.’”  Rendell v. 
Rumsfeld, 484 F.3d 236, 243 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Donovan ex rel. Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 
336 F.3d 211, 217 (3d Cir. 2003)).  
 In U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co., the Supreme Court 
recognized an exception to this general practice when 
“mootness results from settlement.”  513 U.S. at 25.  If the 
parties settle the dispute while the case is pending on appeal, 
“the losing party has voluntarily forfeited his legal 
remedy . . . , thereby surrendering his claim to the equitable 
remedy of vacatur.”  Id.   
 The Supreme Court recognized the limited nature of 
the exception created by Bancorp in Alvarez.  There plaintiffs 
brought a due process challenge to the State of Illinois’s 
hearing procedures following the seizure of personal property 
suspected of being used to facilitate a drug crime.  558 U.S. 
89–90.  The District Court granted the defendants’ motion to 
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dismiss.  Id. at 91.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit reversed.  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari, but before the case was argued the State 
voluntarily dismissed the proceedings against the plaintiffs 
and returned the property, thereby mooting the underlying 
dispute.  Id. at 91–92.  The Supreme Court concluded that the 
mootness resulted from the “happenstance” of the separate 
State court proceedings, and not by the choice of either party 
to relinquish the appeal.  Id. at 94.  Although the State played 
a role in resolving the property disputes, those cases were 
decided on substantive grounds, and “the presence of [the] 
federal case played no significant role in the termination of 
the separate state-court proceedings.”  Id. at 96–97.  As such, 
the Court vacated the Circuit Court’s opinion.  Id.   
 Mootness in our case arose when the Board issued its 
decision and order on the merits of the complaint against 
Somerset Valley.  As in Alvarez, the underlying dispute was 
resolved on the merits in an administrative proceeding 
separate from the temporary injunction spawning the cross-
appeals.  The Board therefore did not voluntarily forfeit its 
right to a legal remedy on appeal.  In addition, as both parties 
challenged the District Court’s ruling, there is no evidence of 
“manipulation of the legal system, or an attempt to erase an 
unfavorable precedent” through seeking vacatur.  Rendell, 
484 F.3d at 243. 
 Somerset Valley argues that the Court’s opinion has 
continuing relevance, although no legal effect, because the 
NLRB took judicial notice of the testimony offered before the 
District Court and the Board has asked that Court to rely on 
testimony presented at the hearing in another action involving 
these parties.  Vacating the opinion and order entered by the 
District Court, however, will have no effect on the existence 
or record of the proceedings before it.  Indeed, we know of no 
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ruling that would hinder Somerset Valley from relying on 
appropriate facts in the District Court record. 
 In this case, neither party has relinquished its challenge 
to the District Court’s opinion and order giving temporary 
injunctive relief, but we are unable to review the decision 
because, by the Board’s subsequent ruling on the merits, the 
Court’s prior ruling is now moot.  Hence, all that vacating the 
prior opinion and order does is protect the parties from any 
adverse legal consequences of that unreviewed opinion.  
 For these reasons, we dismiss the appeal and cross-
appeal as moot and remand with the direction that the District 
Court vacate its April 16, 2012 opinion and order.  Our 
decision to direct that Court to vacate its opinion is based 
solely on the mootness of the appeals before us and the 
governing Supreme Court law.  We undertake no review of 
the District Court’s very careful and well-articulated opinion 
in this case.  Indeed, we deeply appreciate the exceptionally 
hard work of Judge Cooper. 
